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SUMMARY

The implosion of market bubbles has laid the groundwork for an
explosion in bankruptcy litigation arising from Ponzi schemes.' The
Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice's criminal
division explains that "[t]he financial meltdown has resulted in the exposure of numerous fraudulent schemes that otherwise might have
gone undetected for a longer period of time."2 The Bernard Madoff
and Allan Stanford cases are not isolated. Consider the following
2009 statistics:
t

Bob Bruner is an associate with Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.'s bankruptcy and

insolvency group. Prior to joining Fulbright, Bob clerked for Judge Marvin Isgur,
Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge for the Southern District of Texas.
1. Curt Anderson, Ponzi Schemes' Collapses Nearly Quadrupled in '09,
LAW.COM, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202
437299784.
2. Id.
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* An estimated $16.5 billion in investor funds wiped out by
fraudulent investment schemes3
* Over 2,100 investment fraud cases opened by the FBI 4
* An 82% annual increase in restraining orders issued by the
SEC 5
* 100%+ increase in actions filed by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission in Ponzi scheme cases 6
As investigations mature, numerous entities orchestrating Ponzi
schemes will be forced into bankruptcy and trustees will be handed
the job of collecting estate assets and fairly distributing these assets to
creditors.
For much of the last twenty years, the trustee's task has been hampered by the common-law equitable doctrine of in pari delicto. In pari
delicto means "of equal fault"' and is used to prevent a wrongdoer
from using the courts to recover against a fellow wrongdoer.' It is
well established that bankruptcy trustees must prosecute claims subject to an in pari delicto defense.' Traditionally, trustee's claims have
been dismissed when they were unable to defeat the defense.o
Commentators and dissents have criticized the holdings for their inequitable results." Criticism notes that dismissing trustee claims
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 135 (1968), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
8. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985); see
also Thomas J. Hall & Janice A. Payne, Defenses to Claims by Bankruptcy Trustees
Against Lenders: The In Pari Delicto Defense and the "Wagoner Rule," 123 BANKING

L.J. 3, 4 (2006) ("In pari delicto is a broadly recognized common law doctrine under
which a plaintiff is barred from pursuing claims against a defendant where the plaintiff was involved in the defendant's wrongful conduct on which the claims are based,
and is at least equally at fault with the defendant for that wrongful conduct.").
9. See, e.g., Mosier v. Callister, Nebeker & McCullough, 546 F.3d 1271, 1276
(10th Cir. 2008) ("Thus, it is well established that in pari delicto may bar an action by
a bankruptcy trustee against third parties who participated in or facilitated wrongful
conduct of the debtor."); see also Eric W. Anderson & Joshua J. Lewis, Aiding and
Abetting Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty Claims in a Post-Recession Economy, 28 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (2009) (noting that courts have applied in pari delicto such that

third-parties "were almost, by definition, immunized from any possible liability for
aiding and abetting in a breach-of-fiduciary-duty.").
10. Tanvir Alam, FraudulentAdvisors Exploit Confusion in the Bankruptcy Code:
How In Pari Delicto Has Been Perverted To Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors,

77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 307 (2003) (describing the "mechanical analysis" circuit
courts have used "to bar the trustee or a creditors' committee from pursuing state law
claims such as fraud or breach of fiduciary duties against the third party advisors of
the debtor").
11. Id. at 306 ("In reality, however, application of the equitable doctrine produces
wholly inequitable results: creditors, who did not participate in the wrongdoing, are
prevented from recovering the money that was, in essence, swindled from them in the
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merely punishes innocent creditors while granting a windfall to complicit outside professionals.12 The result could not be more opposed
to in pari delicto's purpose of preventing wrongdoers from using
courts to benefit from their malfeasance and deterring future illegal
conduct.
Recent opinions from the Fifth Circuit have recently given trustees
a new legal foundation that may withstand in pari delicto attacks."
The opinions demonstrate that the assertion of the in pari delicto defense merely creates an equitable hurdle rather than an absolute bar
to trustee prosecutions.14 Since 2007, three federal courts in Texas
have issued opinions that applied in pari delicto to a trustee without
dismissing the trustee's claims.'" The Fifth Circuit has not directly
ruled on in pari delicto's application to trustees. However, the Fifth
Circuit may have pre-ordained its interpretation of in pari delicto in
the Court's 2008 Kane v. National Union Fire Insurance Company

opinion.' 6 The Kane opinion considered the application of another
equitable defense, judicial estoppel, to trustees." The Fifth Circuit
applied an analysis of § 541 consistent with the Texas lower courts to
hold that the debtor's wrongful conduct should not bar the trustee's
claims.' 8
Prior holdings were not wrong so much as incomplete. Much of the
precedent was presented only with the question of whether or not in
pari delicto applies to trustees.' 9 The precedent recognized that, pursuant to § 541, a trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor so that the
most logical and cost-efficient context-the bankruptcy process."); Jeffrey Davis,
Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has Nothing to Do with What Is
§ 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 519, 541-42
(2005) (arguing that dismissing trustee claims based on in pari delicto interferes with
the purposes of bankruptcy: "fair treatment to creditors and investors and the promotion of a high standard of business ethics among professionals who serve and participate in the affairs of corporate managers").
12. Alam, supra note 10, at 305-06 (noting that "[b]ecause some courts have misapplied the doctrine of 'in pari delicto,' . . . bankruptcy estates may be forced to let
these third party wrongdoers escape civil liability" while innocent creditors are
punished).
13. See Kane v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam); Floyd v. CIBC World Mkts., Inc., 426 B.R. 622 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Milbank v.
Holmes (In re TOCFHBI, Inc.), 413 B.R. 523 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (mem. op.);
Hill v. Day (In re Today's Destiny, Inc.), 388 B.R. 737 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (mem.
op.); Smith v. Woodforest Nat'l Bank (In re IFS Fin. Corp.), Bankr. No. 02-39553,
Adv. No. 04-3841, 2007 WL 1308321 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2007) (mem. op.).
14. See Kane, 535 F.3d at 386-88; Floyd, 426 B.R. at 642-43; In re TOCFHBI, 413
B.R. at 536-37; In re Today's Destiny, 388 B.R. at 746-50; In re IFS, 2007 WL
1308321, at 3.
15. Floyd, 426 B.R. at 642; In re TOCFHBI, 413 B.R. at 536-37; In re Today's
Destiny, 388 B.R. at 747-50; In re IFS, 2007 WL 1308321, at *3-5.
16. Kane, 535 F.3d 380.
17. Id. at 383.
18. Id. at 386-88.
19. See, e.g., Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1281,
1284-86 (10th Cir. 1996).
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trustee's claims are subject to any defenses that could have been asserted against the debtor.2 0 Accordingly, the debtor's wrongful conduct is imputed to the trustee and the trustee's claims are subject to
the in pari delicto defense.2 1 Analysis ended with the conclusion that
in pari delicto applied and the courts dismissed the trustee's claims.22
Trustees apparently failed to ask courts to consider the distinction between defining rights and applying rights.
Fifth Circuit courts completed the analysis by taking the next step of
applying the in pari delicto defense. Fifth Circuit courts were
presented with a different question: not whether or not the debtor's
wrongful conduct must be imputed to the trustee, but whether the
trustee's claims should be dismissed because of that imputation.2 3
Consistent with prior precedent, Fifth Circuit courts recognized that
when determining what rights and liabilities a debtor is subject to,
§ 541 requires courts to consider only the facts existing pre-petition.2 4
But Fifth Circuit courts also recognized that § 541's limitations are not
imposed when applying the rights and liabilities.2 5 When applying a
defense, courts must take into account the post-petition reality. 2 6
Otherwise, courts would have to award judgments for claims on unpaid accounts without taking into account post-petition payments.
Otherwise, courts would have to dismiss breach of contract claims
based on a failure to mitigate damages because the mitigation occurred post-petition. Otherwise, an equitable doctrine becomes a tool
of inequity. Definition is distinct from application.
The Fifth Circuit courts' analysis is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. The Supreme Court has not considered in pari delicto's
application to bankruptcy trustees. But the Court has twice considered in pari delicto's application to claims arising under other federal
statutes. In both instances, the Court refused to dismiss the claims
on in pari delicto grounds. 28 The Court emphasized that "[w]e have
often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking broad common-law
20. Id. at 1285 ("Congress intended the trustee to stand in the shoes of the debtor
and 'take no greater rights than the debtor himself had."' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95595, at 368 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323)).
21. Id. ("Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Sender must rely on 11 U.S.C. § 541 for
his standing in this case, he may not use his status as a trustee to insulate the partnership from the wrongdoing of Mr. Donahue and HIA Inc.").
22. Id.

23. See, e.g., Hill v. Day (In re Today's Destiny, Inc.), 388 B.R. at 737, 748 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2008) (mem. op.) (noting that Texas law requires courts to consider the
public policy implications of dismissing claims "even when parties are in pari
delicto").
24. Id.

25. See id. at 748-49.
26. Id.

27. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-11 (1985);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-40 (1968), overruled
by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
28. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306-11; Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138-40.
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barriers to relief where a private suit serves important public purposes." 29 The Court reasoned that in pari delicto cannot be applied
without considering its effect on the federal statute giving rise to the
cause of action.o In the context of antitrust statutes, the Court held
that in pari delicto could not be applied without unduly impinging
upon the statute's purpose of fostering competition. 3 1 In the context
of securities statutes, the Court held that in pari delicto could not be
applied without unduly impinging upon the statute's purpose of deterring illegal trading.3 2 In the context of the Bankruptcy Code, in pari
delicto cannot be applied without unduly impinging upon the statute's
purpose of providing an orderly and equitable distribution of estate
assets to creditors.
A boom in bankruptcy-related litigation is dawning.34 Persuasive
opinions from Fifth Circuit courts now give trustees the legal framework to pursue in pari delicto causes of actions to ensure participants
in fraudulent schemes are held accountable, and innocent creditors
receive a more equitable recovery.
The following Article is organized in five parts: (1) part I places the
in pari delicto issue in context by describing a hypothetical scenario in
which in pari delicto typically arises; (2) part II describes the in pari
delicto doctrine and its purposes; (3) part III summarizes the circuit
court opinions applying in pari delicto to dismiss trustee claims; (4)
part IV explains the Fifth Circuit's application of in pari delicto; and
(5) part V argues that the Fifth Circuit application is most consistent
with § 541's plain-language, Supreme Court precedent, and the purposes of the in pari delicto doctrine.

I. THE BIG PICTURE
Fred awoke with a lingering vision that lead paint would be the hot
commodity of 2005. Fred decides that he will incorporate Hot Stock
Inc. to engage in lead paint trading. He decides that the most prudent
way to run the business is by risking other people's money. Accordingly, through Hot Stock, Fred will sell investors promissory notes and
29. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 307; Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138.
30. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310-11; Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138-39.
31. Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 139-40 (holding that in pari delicto does not apply to
anti-trust actions because the statute favors private actions "to further the overriding
public policy in favor of competition").
32. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310 (holding that in pari delicto cannot be inflexibly applied to securities actions because the actions "provide 'a most effective weapon
in the enforcement' of the securities laws and are 'a necessary supplement to Commission action."' (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), abrogated by
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979))).
33. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1939) (noting that the Bankruptcy
Code vests bankruptcy courts with "the power and duty" to "sift the circumstances
surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration
of the bankrupt estate").
34. Anderson, supra note 1.
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use the investor proceeds to fund his trades. Fred hires a team of
lawyers to help him incorporate Hot Stock and draft the promissory
notes. He hires a team of investment bankers to help him sell the
notes and execute trades. He hires lawyers and accountants to ensure
compliance with applicable financial regulations.
Fred produces Hot Stock account statements showing 20% annual
returns and mails them to investors. He uses the account statements
to encourage existing investors to buy more promissory notes and solicit their friends to buy notes. He even promises investors who solicit
new investors a 10% commission on new investor funds they attract.
With ballooning account balances and super-sized returns, few investors request account withdrawals while most invest additional funds.
Five years and $100 million later, investors awake with the lingering
vision that their funds are lost. Fred knew nothing about commodity
trading and never intended to create a profitable company, it turns
out. Fred simply grew tired of driving a Honda and furnishing at Ikea.
He wanted the good life and knew that an old-fashioned Ponzi scheme
was a quick road to riches.
The lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants never intended
for the investors to be duped. Of course, they knew that Fred had no
background in commodity trading and never asked how he planned to
make a profit. They knew that Fred personally typed up the Hot
Stock account statements. They knew that Fred personally created
the financial statements that were sent to the accountants for auditing.
No one asked how Fred arrived at the numbers on the financial statements or asked to do an internal audit. Fred paid his bills on time and
never asked for a fee reduction.
A creditor forces Hot Stock into bankruptcy and a trustee is appointed. The trustee files an adversary proceeding asserting claims for
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against Fred. The trustee also asserts claims for aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
against the professionals. The trustee contends that Fred could not
have defrauded a thousand people out of $100 million without the
professionals' assistance. Moreover, even if the professionals did not
actually know that Fred was orchestrating a Ponzi scheme, they at
least should have known.

Logic and equity suggest that the trustee has strong aiding and abetting claims. Yet since 1991, circuit courts that have considered a bankruptcy trustee's claims in this context have routinely dismissed the
trustee's claims. The circuit courts did not dismiss the claims based on
improper conduct engaged in by the trustee or creditors. Nor did the
courts dismiss the claims based on an inflexible defense like a statute
of limitations bar. Rather, the circuit courts dismissed the claims and
effectively immunized complicit outsiders by applying in pari delicto.
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II. IN PARI DELIcTo's PURPOSE
In pari delicto is a common-law doctrine meaning "[in a case of
equal or mutual fault ... the position of the [defending] party ... is

the better one."35 It means that when two crooks conspire to cheat
and steal, one crook cannot sue the other crook for damages he suffered based on his accomplice's conduct. "The defense is grounded on
two premises: first, that courts should not lend their good offices to
mediating disputes among wrongdoers; and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring
illegality."3 6 "The equitable powers of this court can never be exerted
in behalf of [one] who has acted fraudulently, or who by deceit or any
unfair means has gained an advantage . . . [t]o aid a party in such a

case would make this court the abetter of iniquity.""
The defense is an equitable doctrine.38 Like all equitable doctrines,
in pari delicto should be interpreted flexibly and take into account the
facts and circumstances of each case to fashion an equitable result."
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that, when applying equitable doctrines, courts "are not bound by formula or restrained by any
limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise of
discretion."40
Applying the in pari delicto defense to dismiss a lawsuit brought by
a corporate insider against outside professionals makes sense. Dismissing the claim prevents the malfeasant insider from using the
courts to profit from his wrong and deters future illegal conduct by
precluding the insider from mitigating his liability.
In Fred's case, applying the defense to dismiss a trustee's claims
does not fit as neatly with in pari delicto's purpose. When the trustee
asserts the claim to increase estate distributions to innocent creditors,
Fred becomes irrelevant. Any proceeds from the claim will go only to
Fred's innocent creditors. The only malfeasant parties affected are
the defendants who aided and abetted Fred's fraud. Allowing the
trustee to prosecute the claims deters future illegal conduct by ensuring that those who aided and abetted are held fully accountable. Dismissing the trustee's claims encourages aiding and abetting by
insulating those defendants from liability.
35. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306 (quoting BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 711 (5th
ed. 1979)).

36. Id.
37. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) (quoting
Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848)).
38. See id.
39. See Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310 (noting that courts must undertake "a
careful consideration of such [public policy] implications before allowing the
defense").

40. Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245-46.
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PRIOR PRECEDENT

From 1991 to the present, the seven circuit courts that have considered in pari delicto's application to bankruptcy trustees have applied
the doctrine to dismiss trustees' claims for aiding and abetting fraud
and breach of fiduciary duties against third parties.4 1 The circuits'
analysis has shifted from a focus on standing to the language of § 541,
but the results have remained the same.
According to the circuit courts, seven words within § 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code demand dismissal regardless of the practical equities involved: "as of the commencement of the case." 42 The circuit
courts reason that these seven words require courts to analyze the
claim in a hypothetical pre-petition world.4 3 In this hypothetical
world, the debtor is asserting the claim, not the trustee. In this hypothetical world, the debtor benefits from the claim, not innocent creditors. The post-petition reality is irrelevant. Though the dismissal of
the claims leads to inequitable results in the real post-petition world,
dismissal serves in pari delicto's purposes in the hypothetical pre-petition world and § 541 requires courts to ignore the real for the
hypothetical."
A.

The Second Circuit's Standing Analysis

The Second Circuit first considered in pari delicto in Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner.45 In Wagoner, Mr. Kirschner created

HMK Management Corporation to execute stock trades.4 6 He issued
promissory notes in HMK's name to investors and used the note proceeds to fund the stock trading. 47 Kirschner opened trading accounts
with Shearson Lehman Hutton to execute his trades.4 8 Shearson also
allowed Kirschner to use a desk and equipment in its offices. 49 After
Kirschner's enterprise crumbled and HMK filed for bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy trustee filed a suit asserting, among other claims, breach
41. Mosier v. Callister, Nebeker & McCullough, 546 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2008);
Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145 (11th Cir. 2006); Grassmueck v. Am.
Shorthorn Ass'n, 402 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2005); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001); Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin
Sec., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 1997); Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Invs.
Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1996); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner,
944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991).
42. See, e.g., In re Hedged-Invs., 84 F.3d at 1285.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Shearson, 944 F.2d at 114.
46. Id. at 116.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Shearson and
on behalf of the HMK estate.so
The Second Circuit ruled that the trustee lacked standing to assert
the claims against Shearson."' The Court noted that, as representative
of the estate, the trustee "stands in the shoes of the bankrupt corporation."5 2 Under § 541, all legal and equitable interests the debtor acquired prior to the petition date became property of the estate.
Accordingly, the trustee has no greater rights than the debtor had and
was subject to the same defenses the debtor would have faced.54 The
Court held that New York law simply does not recognize an aiding
and abetting cause by a corporation that committed fraud against a
third party alleged to have assisted the fraud. Rather, under New
York law, only the creditors could bring such a claim.56 Accordingly,
the Court dismissed the trustee's aiding and abetting claims for lack of
standing.
B.

From Standing to § 541

Subsequent circuit court opinions recognized that the Wagoner
Court erred by focusing on standing.58 "An analysis of standing does
not include an analysis of equitable defenses, such as in pari delicto.
Whether a party has standing to bring claims and whether a party's
claims are barred by an equitable defense are two separate questions,
to be addressed on their own term."5 9 The shift in the analysis's focus
from standing to merits did not alter the results.
The Tenth Circuit's 1996 In re Hedged-Investments opinion set forth
the in pari delicto analysis adopted by the other circuit courts.o In
Hedged-Investments, Mr. Donahue created limited partnerships and
sold interests in the partnerships to investors.6 1 The partnerships were
organized to effectuate a Ponzi scheme.6 2 The entities generated no
real revenue and the enterprises' continued operation depended on
paying old investments with new investments.63 After Hedged-Invest50. Id. at 117.
51. Id. at 120.
52. Id. at 118.
53. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
54. Shearson, 944 F.2d at 118.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 119-20.
57. Id. at 120.
58. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267
F.3d 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2001); Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377,
380 (6th Cir. 1997).
59. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 346 (citing In re Dublin Sec., 133 F.3d at 380).
60. Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir.
1996).
61. Id. at 1282.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1282 & n.1.
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ments filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the trustee sued Mr.
Donahue's wife for violations of the state partnership statute.64 Ms.
Donahue allegedly executed several partnership agreements and received funds in violation of the state partnership laws. 5
The Tenth Circuit held that Mr. Donahue's wrongful conduct
barred the trustee's suits based on in pari delicto.6 6 The Tenth Circuit
noted that standing was not an issue.67 Section 541 gave the trustee
standing to assert the claim.6 8 The trustee has control over property
of the estate and § 541(a)(1) defines as property of the estate "all legal
or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case."69 The Tenth Circuit placed special emphasis on the
phrase "as of the commencement of the case."
The Court reasoned that the phrase had both "temporal and qualitative limitations" on estate property.70 The temporal component defines property of the estate based on the petition date.7 1 "In a
temporal sense, it establishes a clear-cut date after which property acquired by the debtor will normally not become property of the bankruptcy estate." 72
The qualitative component defines the contours of the estate's
rights in the property.73 The qualitative component limits the estate's
rights to the rights the debtor had prior to the petition date and precludes the petition from enlarging those rights. 74 The Court explained
that "Congress intended the trustee to stand in the shoes of the debtor
and 'take no greater rights than the debtor himself had.'" 7 To ensure
that the trustee takes no greater right, the courts must consider the
claim as it existed "as of the commencement of the case." 76
Under the Tenth Circuit's view, § 541 is a winnower of rights. Imagine all the debtor's property interests as sticks gathered into a bundle.
The temporal component removes those sticks that were acquired af64. Id. at 1282.
65. Id. at 1283.
66. Id. at 1284 ("We base our decision on 'the elementary principle that one who
has himself participated in a violation of law cannot be permitted to assert in a court
of justice any right founded upon or growing out of the illegal transaction."' (quoting
Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 857 (D. Utah 1987)
(mem. op.))).
67. Id. at 1285.
68. Id.
69. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010); In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 84
F.3d at 1285 (emphasis added).
70. In re Hedged-Invs., 84 F.3d at 1285 (emphasis added).
71. See id.
72. Id. (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
541.05).
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 368, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6323); see also Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006).
76. In re Hedged-Invs., 84 F.3d at 1285.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol17/iss2/2
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V17.I2.1

10

Bruner: The Collapse of the in Pari Delicto Defense to Bankruptcy Trustee

2011]

BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE CLAIMS

101

ter the petition date. The qualitative component shaves down sticks
that have grown post-petition to their pre-petition form.
Under this view, courts must evaluate the trustee's claim as it existed in the pre-petition world. In the hypothetical pre-petition world,
only the debtor could have brought the claim on the debtor's own
behalf. In the pre-petition world, in pari delicto would bar the debtor
from recovering on the claim based on his wrongful conduct. Pursuant to § 541's qualitative component, the trustee must be treated the
same as the debtor would have been treated in the hypothetical prepetition world. The trustee "may not use his status as trustee to insulate the partnership from the wrongdoing" of the partnership's principal." The fact that an innocent party is bringing the claim on behalf
of innocent creditors is irrelevant.7 8 The trustee's claim must be dismissed just as if the debtor himself asserted the claim. 79
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the inequities of its decision.so
"To be sure, Mr. Sender articulates sound reasons why it might be
wise to allow an exception to this rule in cases, such as this one, where
the trustee's efforts stand to benefit hundreds of innocent investors." 8 '
The Court also acknowledged that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
had not applied in paridelicto to receivers seeking recoveries for innocent creditors. 82 However, the receivership cases did not implicate the
Bankruptcy Code and the Court felt that its result was compelled by
the qualitative component of the "as of the commencement of the
case" language of § 541.83 The Court noted that "[i]t falls beyond the
province of this court to let policy considerations override our interpretation of the text and the clear intent of an act of Congress .... "84
The First," Third,86 Sixth, Eighth, 8 and Eleventh8 9 Circuits subsequently considered the trustee's ability to assert claims against third
parties who participated in the debtor's fraud. All the cases involve a
factual scenario similar to the Fred Hot Stock Inc. hypothetical. Debtors created corporations or partnerships to run a fraudulent scheme,
and the trustee for the debtor's bankruptcy estate sued outsiders who
allegedly aided and abetted fraud or breaches of fiduciary duties.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1285-86.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1285.
82. Id. at 1284-85.
83. Id. at 1285-86.
84. Id. at 1286.
85. Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 6-9 (1st Cir. 2006).
86. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340,
356 (3d Cir. 2001).
87. Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377, 379-80 (6th Cir. 1997).
88. Grassmueck v. Am. Shorthorn Ass'n, 402 F.3d 833, 841-42 (8th Cir. 2005).
89. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d
1145, 1150-51 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Each Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit's Hedged-Investments analysis
of § 541 to bar trustee claims against third parties based on in pari
delicto.

Unfortunately, the early circuit court cases were only presented
with the question of whether in pari delicto applied. In In re Hedged-

Investments, the trustee argued only that courts should exempt trustees from in pari delicto for equitable reasons. 90 Trustees focused on
the Seventh and Ninth Circuit receivership cases and the "adverse interest" and "sole-actor" exceptions to imputation of wrongful conduct
to argue that trustees should be immune from in pari delicto's application. 9 ' The argument was a losing one. Long-standing precedent has
interpreted § 541 as placing the trustee in the shoes of the debtor such
that the trustee can assert no greater claim than the debtor. A corollary of that principal is that the trustee is subject to all the defenses
that the debtor would have faced. Because the fight was narrowed to
whether in pari delicto should be applied, the courts were never given
the opportunity to consider how the defense should be applied. Parties assumed that finding that the defense applied ended the analysis
and barred the claim. The assumption would not change the result for
static defenses like a statute of limitations that requires no discretionary balancing of facts. But what about a fluid defense whose equitable
origins demand just such a discretionary balancing? What happens
when a court parses through the applicable state law conception of in
pari delicto and applies that conception to the facts presented?
None of the courts were presented with the question addressed in
this Article. Does the in pari delicto defense act as a complete bar or
merely as an equitable hurdle that may be overcome? Fifth Circuit
courts were presented with the more nuanced question of how the
defense applies and completed the analysis begun by the prior circuit
court precedent. The Fifth Circuit courts recognized that § 541 subjects trustees to in pari delicto. But Fifth Circuit courts also recognized that § 541 has no bearing on how in pari delicto is applied.
IV.

THE

FivrH

CIRCUIT'S COMPLETION OF THE

IN PARI DELICTo ANALYSIS

Since 2007, Fifth Circuit courts have issued four opinions that completed the in pari delicto analysis begun by prior courts.92 The Fifth
90. Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1281, 1284-85 (10th
Cir. 1996).
91. See e.g., Mosier v. Callister, Nebeker & McCullough, 546 F.3d 1271, 1276-77
(10th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the trustee's "argument that a trustee in bankruptcy is immune to in pari delicto and other defenses based on the debtor's conduct"); Edwards,
437 F.3d at 1149-52; Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP (In re Bennett Funding
Group, Inc.) 336 F.3d 94, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2003) (arguing that the debtor's wrongful
conduct should not be imputed to the trustee).
92. See cases cited supra note 13.
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Circuit courts did not focus on whether trustees are subject to in pari
delicto. The courts adopted the abundant precedent holding that
trustees are subject to in pari delicto. The Fifth Circuit courts instead
focused on a more nuanced question: How does the Texas formulation
of in pari delicto apply to the facts presented?
A.

The Bankruptcy Court's Application of In Pari Delicto

The analysis of in pari delicto's application started with Smith v.
Woodforest Nat'l Bank (In re IFS FinanicalCorp.)." IFS was part of a

conglomeration of corporate entities allegedly organized as a Ponzi
scheme to defraud investors from Mexico.9 4 Woodforest National
Bank funded loans incurred by individuals to invest in IFS.9 5 Woodforest then executed a participation agreement with an IFS affiliated
entity whereby the IFS entity agreed to purchase a 95% interest in the
loans. 96 Under the agreement, Woodforest remained responsible for
collecting the notes. 9 7 Investors never paid on the notes, despite retaining the loan proceeds and other transfers from IFS.98 The trustee
filed an adversary proceeding against Woodforest, asserting various
claims, including conversion and unjust enrichment. 99
Woodforest filed a motion for summary judgment contending that
the trustee lacked standing because in pari delicto barred his claim."
The court quickly dismissed the standing argument.10 The court
noted that the trustee's right to bring a claim and the strength of that
claim are independent issues and cited the supporting post-Waggoner
circuit court precedent.10 2 The court then considered the effect of in
pari delicto on the strength of the trustee's claim.
Consistent with precedent, the Court began its analysis with § 541's
plain language. The Court noted that § 541's plain language provides
that property of the estate includes only the debtor's interests that
existed "as of the commencement of the case."o' Pursuant to § 541,
93. Smith v. Woodforest Nat'1 Bank (In re IFS Fin. Corp.), Bankr. No. 02-39553,
Adv. No. 04-3841, 2007 WL 1308321 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2007) (mem. op.).
94. Id. at *1.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id.
102. Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 6-10 (1st Cir. 2006); Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145, 1149-50 (11th Cir.
2006); In re IFS, 2007 WL 1308321, at *3 ("[W]hether a party has standing and
whether the party's claims are barred by an equitable defense are separate questions.") (citing Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wright (In re Educators Grp. Health Trust), 25 F.3d 1281, 1286 (5th Cir. 1994)).
103. In re IFS, 2007 WL 1308321, at *3 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West 2004
& Supp. 2010)).
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the pre-petition facts define the trustee's right and limitations on that
right." Accordingly, "the Trustee holds only those rights that the
debtor held at the commencement of the case . .. a trustee is subject

to the in pari delicto defense if the defense would have been available
in an action against the debtor.""o' The trustee did not seriously dispute that he was subject to the defense.
Instead, the trustee focused his argument on the application of
Texas's formulation of the in pari delicto. The trustee contended that
even though he may be subject to in pari delicto, that finding did not
end the analysis.10 6 Rather, the trustee contended that under Texas
law, the finding merely triggered a second analysis that required a discretionary balancing of the equities.o'
The Court agreed that special attention needed to be given to the
application of state law.10 In pari delicto is a product of state lawnot federal bankruptcy law. 109 Under Texas state law, finding that the
plaintiff is in pari delicto does not end the analysis. The Court quoted
the Texas Supreme Court's conception of in pari delicto in Lewis v.
Davis:
It has been said that even where the parties are in pari delicto relief
will sometimes be granted if public policy demands it. There is
often involved, in reaching a decision as to granting or withholding
relief, the question whether the policy against assisting a wrongdoer
outweighs the policy against permitting unjust enrichment of one
party at the expense of the other. The solution of the question depends upon on the peculiar facts and the equities of the case, and
the answer usually given is that which it is thought will better serve
public policy. 1 o
Pursuant to Texas Supreme Court precedent, finding that a party is
subject to the in pari delicto defense begins, rather than ends, the analysis. Courts must balance the policy of not lending judicial assistance
to a wrongdoer with that of not permitting another wrongdoer's unjust enrichment. The defense is fluid, requiring a balancing of the equities. When "determining whether allowing a culpable party to
recover promotes public policy, the Court may overlook the respective guilt of the parties ... [t]he court should consider the 'higher right

104. Id.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. at *4.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *3 ("Whether the Trustee's claim is barred by the in pari delicto defense
is governed by Texas law.").
109. Id.
110. Id. at *4 (quoting Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 477, 199 S.W. 2d 146, 151
(1947)).
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of the public; the guilty party to whom relief is granted being only the
instrument by which the public is served."'"n
The Court did not interpret § 541 as limiting the Court to considering a hypothetical pre-petition claim when undertaking the policy
analysis. Though the Court agreed that § 541 made the trustee subject
to the same defenses that could have been asserted against the debtor,
the Court found that § 541 had no bearing on the application of a
defense. The Court held that whether the trustee's claims should be
barred would depend on parties's degrees of culpability and who
would benefit from the trustee's claim.1 2 The Court noted that if evidence demonstrated that only innocent creditors would benefit from
the trustee's claim, "the higher right of the public" may dictate that
the trustee should be allowed to prosecute the claim even though the
trustee is in pari delicto with the defendants.113 The Court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that it could not
undertake the required policy prior to the presentation of evidence at
trial.
Approximately one year later, the same court again considered in
pari delicto's application to a bankruptcy trustee in the In re Today's
Destiny bankruptcy case." 4 The Day brothers incorporated Today's
Destiny to sell predictive auto-dialing equipment to dentists and chiropractors." 5 The Days allegedly represented that the equipment
would perform telemarketing services and guaranteed that the equipment would bring the purchasers a certain number of new clients.
Today's Destiny sold the equipment through third-party lenders.' 17
The lenders financed sales-and-leasing agreements for the equipment.' 18 However, the equipment allegedly never worked as promised and Today's Destiny was forced to file a chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition.11 9
The trustee filed an adversary proceeding against the Days and the
lenders, asserting various claims, including breach of fiduciary duty
and denuding against the Days and other insiders, and aiding and
abetting the debtor's fraud and contribution claims against the lend111. Id. (quoting Wright v. Wight & Wight, 229 S.W. 881, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1921, no writ)).
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Wright v. Wight & Wight, 229 S.W. 881, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1921 no writ)).
114. Hill v. Day (In re Today's Destiny, Inc.), 388 B.R. 737 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)
(mem. op.).
115. Id. at 742.
116. Hill v. Day (In re Today's Destiny, Inc.), Bankr. No. 05-90080, Adv. No. 063285, 2009 WL 1232140, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 1, 2009) (mem. op.); In re Today's Destiny, 388 B.R. at 742.
117. In re Today's Destiny, 388 B.R. at 742.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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ers.12 0 The trustee alleged that the lenders knew Today's Destiny was
selling sham equipment and continued to execute and demand payments on lease agreements despite their knowledge.12 1 The Days and
lenders filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the trustee lacked standing to assert the claims and, in the alternative, that in pari delicto

barred the claims. 12 2
The Court again denied the standing argument: "in pari delicto can
not independently defeat the Trustee's standing to raise a claim." 123
"In the bankruptcy context, the Trustee's standing is a claim ownership issue" whereas in pari delicto is an affirmative defense that goes
to a claim's merits.124 The Court then considered how in pari delicto
affected the merits of the trustee's claims.
The court repeated that a trustee may be subject to in pari delicto
pursuant to § 541.125 The court cited the abundant circuit courts dismissing trustee claims based on in pari delicto.12 6 The court then proceeded to complete the second step of the in pari delicto analysis prior
courts were never prompted to consider.
The court cited the Texas Supreme Court's Lewis opinion for the
proposition that in pari delicto does not automatically bar a claim.12 7
The court still must apply the defense. When applying the defense,
the court again considered the importance of the post-petition reality.
The court noted that the equities of the case would be influenced by
the extent of the debtor's and lender's culpability and whether only
innocent creditors would benefit from any recovery.128 "The Trustee
may be able to demonstrate that any recovery would benefit only innocent creditors, not the wrongdoers."' 2 9 The court declined to dismiss the trustee's claims at the motion to dismiss stage because the
parties' proportional fault and the creditors' recovery could not be
determined prior to the presentation of evidence.130
The court also recognized grossly inequitable results and conflicts
with state law that result by dismissing claims without considering the
post-petition reality. If post-petition reality were ignored, then nothing would preclude the insiders who directly orchestrated the fraud
from relying upon their own wrongful conduct to defeat a trustee's
claims.' 3 1 The court reasoned:
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 742, 744-45.
In re Today's Destiny, 2009 WL 1232140, at *3.
In re Today's Destiny, 388 B.R. at 743.
Id. at 746.
Id.
Id. at 747-48.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Trustee is not asserting claims against third-parties for injuries
arising from Insiders' wrongful conduct. The trustee is asserting
claims against the very Insiders for their own wrongful conduct. No
case, logic, or equitable proposition supports the conclusion that insiders of a bankrupt corporation can insulate themselves from liability by virtue of the illegal character of their conduct. Granting
Insiders relief based on in pari delicto would directly o ose in pari
delicto's purpose of denying assistance to wrongdoers.?2
The court ruled that the insiders who allegedly orchestrated the fraud
could not rely on in pari delicto.
The court also ruled that in pari delicto did not bar trustee's contribution claim against the lenders. 1 3 4 The court first noted that the
Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code did not bar joint tort-feasors
from seeking contribution from another tort-feasor.13 5 Moreover, the
court held that allowing the trustee to assert a contribution claim was
consistent with the purposes of in pari delicto.13 6 In pari delicto was
designed to ensure that wrongdoers "bear full responsibility for their
criminal conduct.""3 ' Contribution claims are based on proportionate
responsibility.138 A wrongdoer can recover from a joint-tortfeasor
only to the extent of the joint-tortfeasor's proportionate responsibility. 139 Accordingly, the contribution claim only assures that the
debtor's liability more closely matches the debtor's responsibility.' 4 0
The court also noted that any proceeds from the contribution claim
would go to innocent creditors rather than the debtor. 1 4 '
B.

The District Court Affirms the Bankruptcy Court's Approach

In Floyd v. CIBC World Markets, a Houston district court adopted
Today's Destiny's approach to in pari delicto's application approximately one year after Today's Destiny was issued.1 42 Seven Seas, the
debtor, was a South American oil and gas exploration company.143 In
2001, Seven Seas faced liquidity problems."1' Seven Seas hired CIBC
to raise funds and issue a fairness opinion for any financial transaction
CIBC helped Seven Seas execute.145 CIBC obtained a $45 million financing deal with Chesapeake Energy Corporation and Seven Seas
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id. at 750.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Floyd v. CIBC World Mkts., Inc., 426 B.R. 622, 642-43 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
Id. at 630.
Id.

145. Id.
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insiders.1 46 CIBC issued multiple fairness opinions approving the financing.1 4 7 The financing proved insufficient to save Seven Seas.148
Seven Seas filed a Chapter 11 petition in January of 2003 to void an
involuntary Chapter 7.149 The bankruptcy court confirmed Seven
Seas' Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.150 Post-confirmation, the reorganized debtor asserted various claims against CIBC, including
breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting Seven Seas' directors' breaches of fiduciary duties.'
CIBC filed a motion to dismiss.' CIBC argued that the reorganized debtor lacked standing to
assert the claims. 53 In the alternative, CIBC argued that in pari
delicto barred the claims. 154
The district court first rejected the standing argument. The court
noted that the Chapter 11 plan transferred the bankruptcy trustee's
claims to the reorganized debtor.'
The plan contained a provision
providing that the reorganized debtor could assert any claims the
Chapter 11 trustee could have asserted on behalf of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 6 Pursuant to the plan provision, the reorganized
debtor had standing to assert the trustee's claims on behalf of the
bankruptcy estate.15 7
The district court then considered the in pari delicto issue and
adopted Today's Destiny's two-step approach. It first held that reorganized debtor was subject to in pari delicto.15 1 The court cited the
Bankruptcy Court's Today's Destiny's opinion for the proposition that
the Fifth Circuit would likely follow its sister courts in finding that
bankruptcy trustees were subject to in pari delicto.'5 9 Accordingly,
the court found that the estate's claim was burdened with the same
defenses that the debtor would have faced had the debtor asserted the
claim pre-petition.16 0
The district court followed Today's Desitny in recognizing that the
in pari delicto analysis required a second step. 1 6 1 Finding that an estate claim is subject to in pari delicto does not end the analysis. The
court recognized that it needed to apply Texas's formulation of in pari
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.

153. Id. at 633.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 642.
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 642.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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delicto to the facts presented. 1 6 2 "[E]ven in situations where the parties are found to be in pari delicto, under Texas law, 'relief will sometimes be granted if public policy demands it."1 63 The court held that
application of the defense "'depends upon the peculiar facts and the
equities of the case, and the answer usually given is that which it is
thought will better serve public policy.""' Such facts and equities
would include consideration of the post-petition reality of a reorganized debtor bringing the claim on behalf of the estate and could not
be considered prior to the presentation of evidence.165
The Today's Destiny in pari delicto analysis has become the prevail-

ing approach in the Fifth Circuit. In July of 2009, a Dallas bankruptcy
court has also adopted the Today's Destiny approach. 6 6 In
TOCFHBI, the trustee sued the debtor's pre-petition lawyers for allegedly assisting the debtor with structuring fraudulent transfers.16 7
The court declined to grant summary judgment based on in pari
delicto.'6 8 The court cited Lewis and Today's Destiny for the principal

that in pari delicto could not be used to dismiss claims prior to undertaking a policy analysis that included consideration of the post-petition reality of who would benefit from the claim. 6 911The Court quoted
Today's Destiny: "The need to consider the 'peculiar facts and equities' is particularly acute when a defendant is asserting the defense
against a trustee who seeks recovery for the benefit of creditors of a
wrongdoer rather than the wrongdoer himself."7 o
As of the date of this article's publication, no Texas court has issued
an opinion disagreeing with Today's Destiny's in pari delicto analysis.
C.

The Fifth Circuit's Guidance in Kane

The Fifth Circuit has not directly ruled on in pari delicto's application to bankruptcy trustees. However, in Kane v. Nat'l Fire Ins., the
Fifth Circuit held that judicial estoppel, another equitable doctrine,
was not an automatic bar to a bankruptcy trustee's claims.17 1 Issued
just months after Today's Destiny, Kane held that courts must take
into account the post-petition reality when applying an equitable de162. Id. at 642-43.
163. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 477, 199 S.W.2d 146, 151 (1947)).
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Hill v. Day (In re Today's Destiny, Inc.), 388 B.R. 737, 749 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2008) (mem. op.)).
166. Milbank v. Holmes (In re TOCFHBI, Inc.), 413 B.R. 523 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2009) (mem. op.).
167. Id. at 527-28.
168. Id. at 537.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Kane v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 386-88 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam).
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fense to claims asserted by a bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the

debtor's estate.172
Kane considered whether a trustee could prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of estate creditors despite the debtor's failure to disclose the lawsuit in his bankruptcy schedules.' 73 In 2002, Kane was injured in a car
accident.1 7 4 Kane filed a lawsuit against the driver, the driver's employer, and the employer's insurance company.175 In 2005, Kane filed
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.17 6 Kane did not disclose the personal injury claim.' 7 7 In 2006, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Kane's failure to disclose the claim judicially
estopped him from pursuing the claim.17 8 The bankruptcy trustee for
the Kane estate moved to substitute himself for Kane.179 The district
court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion on judicial
estoppel grounds and dismissed as moot the trustee's motion to
substitute.so
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decisions.' 8 ' The court
noted that judicial estoppel bars a debtor from asserting a claim that
he failed to disclose in his bankruptcy schedules."8 2 Otherwise, debtors could avoid liabilities and injure creditors by failing to fulfill their
obligation to disclose all assets.' The equities lead to a different conclusion when the trustee is asserting the claim.
The court began with an explanation of how § 541 made the trustee
the real owner of Kane's personal injury claim.' 8 4 Under § 541, the
court noted that all the debtor's assets become property of the estate.'8 5 Once property of the estate, the debtor's interests are extinguished.' 8 6 Failure to disclose an asset does not remove that asset
from the estate.18 7 An asset that a trustee has no knowledge of cannot
be administered, but the non-disclosure does not affect the character
of the asset.'88 The asset was and thus remains property of the estate.18 9 Accordingly, the lawsuit never became property of the debtor
but was and remained property of the estate over which the trustee
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See id.
Id. at 383-84.
Id. at 383.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 383-84.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 385-87.
Id. at 385.
Id.
See id. at 385-87.
See id.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol17/iss2/2
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V17.I2.1

20

Bruner: The Collapse of the in Pari Delicto Defense to Bankruptcy Trustee

BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE CLAIMS

2011]1

111

had exclusive control.' 90 The trustee was the real-party in interest in
the Kane's personal injury lawsuit and the motion to substitute should
have been granted.19 '
The court then considered how it should apply judicial estoppels to
the trustee. The court found that the trustee had standing to assert
the claim under the same provision that gave the trustee standing to
assert the aiding-and-abetting claims in the in pari delicto cases:
§ 541.192 But the Fifth Circuit diverged from prior circuit court opinions' approach to in pari delicto when applying the equitable defense.
Though the trustee had standing to assert the claim under § 541, the
Fifth Circuit did not read that provision as requiring the court to ignore the post-petition reality. Rather than ignoring the fact that the
trustee rather than the debtor was bringing the claim, the court
anchored its decision on that fact.
The court held that the equitable concerns that demand estoppel of
debtors when they bring the claim on their own behalf are absent
when the trustee brings the claim on behalf of creditors. 9 3 The court
cited a Seventh Circuit opinion explaining how the equitable analysis
differed depending on the party bringing the claim:
[The debtor's] nondisclosure in bankruptcy harmed his creditors by
hiding assets from them. Using this same nondisclosure to wipe out
[the debtor's claim against the defendant] would complete the job
by denying creditors even the right to seek some share of the recovery. Yet the creditors have not contradicted themselves in court.
They were not aware of what [the debtor] has been doing behind
their backs. Creditors gypped by [the debtor's] maneuver are hurt a
second time by the district judge's decision. Judicial estoppel is an
equitable doctrine, and using it to land another blow on the victims
of bankruptcy fraud is not an equitable application.1 94
Kane may preordain the Fifth Circuit's application of in pari delicto
to bankruptcy trustees. The Fifth Circuit's statutory analysis and logic
applies equally to in pari delicto claims. In Kane, the trustee had
standing to pursue his claim under the same Code provision the trustees relied upon in the in pari delicto cases: § 541. Section 541 required
the court to impute the debtor's wrongs to the trustee. However, the
court did not read § 541 as also requiring the court to ignore the postpetition reality when applying the equitable analysis triggered by the
imputation. The court not only considered the fact that the trustee
rather than the debtor was bringing the claim, the court anchored its
decision on this fact. Ignoring the post-petition reality would trans190. See id.

191.
192.
193.
194.
2006)).

Id. at 386-87.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 387-88 (quoting Biesek v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 440 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir.
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form an equitable doctrine into a tool of inequity. Using the debtor's
fraudulent conduct "to wipe out [the debtor's claim against the defendant] would complete the job by denying creditors even the right to
seek some share of the recovery."1 9 5 The creditors "were not aware of
what [the debtor had] been doing behind their backs."' 9 6 In pan
delicto, like judicial estoppel, "is an equitable doctrine, and using it to
land another blow on the victims of bankruptcy fraud is not an equitable application."' 9 7
Parties may try to distinguish the Fifth Circuit opinions by noting
that those courts applied Texas law's in pari delicto doctrine. Other
courts applied the state law applicable to their cases. Admittedly,
some state law conceptions may lack the Texas Supreme Court's clear
direction that "even where the parties are in pari delicto relief will
sometimes be granted if public policy demands it."1 98 Some conceptions may exclude a public policy exception and find that under no
circumstances can parties who are in pari delicto seek relief. However, a fifty-state survey of in pari delicto is beyond the scope of this
Article.
This Article does not argue that courts across jurisdictions should
apply the Texas Supreme Court's Lewis analysis and never again dismiss trustee claims on in pari delicto grounds. It argues that courts
across jurisdictions should adopt the Fifth Circuit court's more complete analysis of the in pari delicto issue. Prior courts concentrated on
whether trustees were subject to the defense. That question has been
answered in the affirmative by all the courts. The more important
question dissected by the Fifth Circuit courts is how that defense
applies.
To determine how the defense applies, courts should not focus on
the federal precedent so much as the applicable state law formulations
of in pari delicto. In pari delicto is not a federal equitable doctrine

that requires uniform application. In pari delicto is a product of state
law. Though each state's body of law may articulate the in pari delicto
doctrine with different phrases, the underlying nature and purpose of
the doctrine transcends state boundaries. The nature is fluid, as an
equitable doctrine must be to fulfill its purpose of effectuating equity.
The fluid nature and equitable purpose demand consideration of the
individualized facts born by each case. These facts include who is
bringing the claim and who will benefit from the claim.

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 477, 199 S.W.2d 146, 151 (1947).
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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEFINING AND APPLYING

The Fifth Circuit courts' opinions provided a more complete application of in pari delicto than prior precedent. Much of the prior precedent asked only whether in pari delicto applied to the trustee rather
than whether "public policy demands" allowing the trustee to pursue
claims despite being in pari delicto. Accordingly, the prior precedent
was not asked to recognize the distinction between defining a right
and applying a right.

Precedent and Fifth Circuit courts both correctly note that § 541's
phrase "as of the commencement of the case" circumscribes the trustee's rights and liabilities to those that the debtor bore prior to the
petition date. The proposition that the trustee "stands in the shoes"
of the debtor and is therefore subject to all the defenses that the
debtor would have faced pre-petition is undisputed across circuits. If
one types in the phrase "stands in the shoes" and "bankruptcy" within
the Westlaw electronic search engine for all federal court cases, over
1,100 cases appear. Section 541 effectively defines what rights and lia-

bilities the trustee is subject to. Pursuant to § 541, both precedent and
Fifth Circuit courts correctly hold that a trustee may be in pari delicto
with defendants alleged to have aided and abetted the debtor.
The Fifth Circuit courts then went beyond determining whether in
pari delicto applies to trustees to consider whether, despite being in

pari delicto, the trustee should nevertheless be allowed to assert
claims. The Fifth Circuit courts were forced to recognize that defining
rights and liabilities is separate from applying those rights and liabilities. Though § 541 defines what defenses apply by defining the trustee's rights, § 541 does not dictate the application of those rights.
Section 541 only speaks to "interest of the debtor." Section 541 does
not speak to the application of the debtor's interest.
Consider the example of an unpaid account. A trustee can assert a
claim for an unpaid account only if the debtor could have asserted the
claim. Section 541 requires courts to consider the pre-petition world
to determine if the debtor has a claim. If, pre-petition, the debtor sold
goods to a customer and the customer did not pay, the debtor could
assert a claim for the unpaid account. Under § 541, the trustee can
assert this claim. If the creditor paid half of what was owed on the
account post-petition, the court does not ignore this payment and issues a judgment for the full amount that was owed pre-petition. The
existence of the trustee's right to sue on the account was determined
by pre-petition facts, but the actual applicationmust take into account
the post-petition reality. Nothing within § 541 limits a court's application of rights to pre-petition facts and reading such a limit into § 541
only leads to inequitable results that run counter to the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Code.
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In the in pari delicto context, the debtor's wrongful conduct makes
the trustee subject to an in pari delicto defense just as a customer's
default on an account makes the creditor subject to a claim for an
unpaid account. Pre-petition, the debtor would be subject to the defense. Under § 541, the trustee is also subject to the defense. But,
determining that the trustee is subject to the defense no more ends the
inquiry than a determination that a trustee has a claim for an unpaid
account. The defense must still be applied.
The distinction between static and fluid defenses must also be considered. With respect to many rights and liabilities, determining
whether a party is subject to the right or liability ends the analysis.
For many defenses, the application will not turn on facts. The court
will have to evaluate pre-petition facts to determine if the defense exists. However, once the defense is determined to exist, application of
the defense does not require consideration of facts. Consider a statute
of limitations defense: If the statute of limitations passed pre-petition,
the debtor could not have brought the suit, nor could the trustee. The
application of the defense does not invite consideration of post-petition facts. The defense is static. Finding that the defense exists ends
the analysis.
Other defenses are fluid in the sense that finding that a party is
subject to a defense does not end the analysis. Though pre-petition
facts trigger application of the defense, an essential component of the
defense also requires consideration of facts. For example, in pari
delicto has two components: the first component asks if the debtor
engaged in wrongful conduct; the second component requires a balancing of the equities. Section 541's "as of the commencement of the
case" language answers the first question. The phrase imputes the
debtor's wrongful conduct to the trustee and triggers consideration of
the defense.
In pari delicto's second component asks whether dismissing the
plaintiffs' claims would serve the purposes of the doctrine. Would dismissal preclude wrongdoers from gaining from their malfeasance and
deter future conduct? Analysis of the first component is limited to the
window of facts existing before the petition date. Analysis of the second component has no such limitation The second component invites
a discretionary analysis regarding the relative equities of the case. To
consider the equities and serve the equitable purpose of the doctrine,
courts must take into account the post-petition reality of the trustee
bringing the claim on behalf of innocent creditors just as a court must
take into account a trustee's post-petition mitigation of damages in a
breach of contract suit and a defendant's post-petition payments on an
account that was in default pre-petition.
The Fifth Circuit courts' approach has significant support. The approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's application of in pari
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delicto to claims asserted under non-bankruptcy federal statutes, and
the Seventh and Ninth Circuit's application to receivers.
A.

The Supreme Court's In Pari Delicto Application

The Supreme Court has not directly considered in pari delicto's application to bankruptcy trustees. However, the Supreme Court has
twice considered in pari delicto's application to claims arising under
federal statutes.1 99 In both cases, the Supreme Court held that courts
cannot apply the doctrine without considering how its application will
interact with the implicated federal statute. In both cases, the Supreme Court applied the same two-part analysis invited by the Fifth
Circuit courts: (1) consideration of the plaintiff's wrongful conduct;
and (2) the public policy implications of dismissing the plaintiff's
claim.
In Perma Life Mufflers, the Supreme Court considered whether in
pari delicto should bar a claim under the federal-antitrust statutes.2 00
Plaintiffs were muffler dealers who signed sales agreements with Midas.2 01 The sales agreements restricted what the dealers could buy
and what and how they could sell.20 2 Plaintiffs alleged that Midas and
affiliated entities and insiders subsequently conspired to violate sections of the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts through discrimina20
tory pricing.203 Defendants alleged that by entering into sales
agreements alleged to have violated the antitrust statutes, dealers participated in the violations. 204 Based on the dealers' own involvement
in the antitrust violations, defendants argued that in pari delicto
barred their claims.20 5 The district court agreed and dismissed the
dealers' suit.20 6
The Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that equitable doctrines cannot be applied to claims asserted under federal statutes without considering the effect on the purposes of the statute.20 7
The Court stated, "[w]e have often indicated the inappropriateness of
invoking broad common-law barriers to relief where a private suit
serves important public purposes." 2 08 The Court then considered
whether applying in pari delicto to the dealers' claim would disserve
199. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 301 (1985);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968), overruled
by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
200. Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 135.

201. Id.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

136-37.
135.
140.
135-36.

206. Id.
207. Id. at 138-40.
208. Id. at 138.
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the purposes of the antitrust statutes and serve the purposes of in pari
delicto.

The Court found that applying in pari delicto would be inconsistent
with both the purposes of the antitrust statutes and in pari delicto.2 0 9
The Court noted that the antitrust statutes were enacted to foster
competition, and their ability to protect competition depended on private enforcement through private lawsuits. 210 Barring the dealers'
claims would diminish the antitrust statute's enforcement mechanism.
Moreover, rejecting the defense would not lead to an inequitable result. Though a wrongdoing plaintiff may obtain financial gain from
the lawsuit, the plaintiff remains civilly and criminally liable for his
own conduct.2 1 1
Perma Life did not wholly foreclose application of in pari delicto to
antitrust suits. The Court implied that in pari delicto could still bar a
lawsuit where the plaintiffs played a more active role in the underlying
criminal conduct.2 1 2 The Court effectively invited the same two-party
analysis applied by the Texas lower courts. A plaintiff's wrongful conduct makes the plaintiff subject to the defense. However, whether or
not the defense should lead to dismissal of the plaintiff's claims depends on analysis of the doctrines "complex scope, contents, and

effects." 213
The Supreme Court subsequently applied Perma Life's reasoning to
an in pari delicto defense to a lawsuit arising under the federal Securities Exchange Act.2 14 In Bateman Eichler, corporate insiders and broker-dealers passed what they represented as being material, true, nonpublic information to certain investors.2 1 5 The investors purchased securities based on these representations.2 1 6 The representations were
in fact false and the investors suffered losses.2 17 Subsequently, the investors sued the insider and dealers under the federal Securities and
Exchange Act. 218 Defendants sought dismissal, arguing that the investors were in pari delicto since their own trading on insider information
also violated the Securities Act.2 19 The district court dismissed the
case, and the Ninth Circuit reversed based on Perma Life.220
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, emphasizing the
need to consider in pari delicto's effects on the goals of the federal
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
Id. at 301-03.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 303-04.
See id. at 304.
Id. at 304-05.
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statute. 2 21 The Court reiterated "the inappropriateness of invoking
broad common-law barriers to relief where a private suit serves important public purposes." 2 2 2 "[T]he classic formulation of the in pari
delicto doctrine itself required a careful consideration of such [public
policy] implications before allowing the defense." 2 23 Private lawsuits
for violations of the Securities Act, like private actions to enforce the
antirust acts, equally serve the public purpose of enforcing the statutes. Therefore, the Court concluded "that the views expressed in
Perma Life apply with full force to implied causes of action under the
federal securities laws." 224 Dismissing the lawsuits "would inexorably
result in a number of alleged fraudulent practices going undetected by
the authorities and unremedied." 225
Nothing in the Supreme Court's Perma Life or Bateman decisions
suggests that their reasoning would not be applied with equal force to
trustee claims arising under the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy
Code, like the antirust and securities statutes, is a federal statute that
serves an important public purpose. The underlying purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code is to provide a mechanism to afford an orderly and
equitable distribution of estate assets to creditors.2 2 6 Uniformly applying in pari delicto to bankruptcy trustees disserves this purpose in
two ways. First, it encourages creditors to pursue individualized litigation, creating a competition among creditors for the debtor's assets.
Second, it reduces innocent creditors' recovery from the bankruptcy
estate by granting a windfall to a malfeasant third party.
The Author found only one circuit court opinion that discussed the
Supreme Court in pari delicto opinions. In Edwards, the Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court twice declined to apply
in pari delicto, but reasoned that the Court's decisions were distinguishable from Edwards because the plaintiffs in the instances in
which the Supreme Court declined to apply in pari delicto had not
played a substantial or active role in the alleged fraud. 2 27 In Edwards,
the debtor was the main culprit. 228 None of the courts acknowledged
how dismissing the trustee's claims thwarts the equitable distribution
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.
221. Id. at 305-19.
222. Id. at 307 (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
138 (1968), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752

(1984)).
223. Id. at 310.

224. Id.
225. Id. at 315.
226. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1939); G.H. Leidenheimer Baking Co.
v. Sharp (In re SGM Acquisition Co.), 439 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2006).
227. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d
1145, 1153-56 (11th Cir. 2006).
228. Id. at 1155.
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The Receiver Cases

The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have issued opinions explaining in
pari delicto's flexible nature and the potential for inequity when applying the defense to innocent third parties asserting claims on behalf
of innocent creditors. 229 Both courts considered cases involving receivers asserting claims against third parties who allegedly assisted a
corporate fraud.2 30 In O'Melveny & Myers, the FDIC took over a
failed savings and loan.2 31 The appointed receiver sued the savings
and loan's attorneys for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.232
In Scholes, the SEC had a receiver appointed for a conglomerate of
corporate entities organized for a ponzi scheme.2 3 3 The receiver asserted fraudulent transfer claims against individuals and entities who
received transfers from the corporate entities.2 34
The O'Melveny and Scholes courts both recognized how substituting an innocent party for the wrongdoer as the plaintiff affects the in
pari delicto analysis. Both courts considered cases involving receivers
asserting claims against third parties who allegedly assisted a corporate fraud. The Courts acknowledged that "'[a] receiver occupies no
better position than that which was occupied by the person or party
for whom he acts ... and any defense good against the original party

is good against the receiver. "'235
However, the Courts reasoned that the purposes of in pari delicto
would be disserved if the doctrine were used to dismiss the receiver's
claim. "While a party may itself be denied a right or defense on account of its misdeeds, there is little reason to impose the same punishment on a trustee, receiver or similar innocent entity that steps into
the party's shoes pursuant to court order or operation of law." 23 6 "put
differently, the defense of in pari delicto loses its sting when the person who is in pari delicto is eliminated." 23 7 Applying in pari delicto
grants a windfall to the malfeasant defendant while punishing innocent third parties. To apply in pari delicto "would be to elevate form
over substance-something courts sitting in equity traditionally will
not do." 238
229. See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam);
Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995).
230. See O'Melveny, 61 F.3d at 18-19; Scholes, 56 F.3d at 752.
231. O'Melveny, 61 F.3d at 17.
232. Id.
233. Scholes, 56 F.3d at 752.
234. Id. at 753.
235. O'Melveny, 61 F.3d at 19 (quoting Allen v. Ramsay, 4 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583 (Ct.
App. 1960)).
236. Id.
237. Scholes, 56 F.3d at 754-55 (citing McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140, 160
(1935)).
238. O'Melveny, 61 F.3d at 19 (citing Drexel v. Berney, 122 U.S. 241, 254 (1887)).
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The circuit courts dismissing bankruptcy trustee claims recognized
the Seventh and Ninth Circuit opinions and the inequities that would
result in dismissing the trustee's claims on in pari delicto grounds.2 3 9
Many expressed reservations about dismissing the claims and suggested that they would rule otherwise if the law allowed.2 40 Yet the
courts noted that Scholes and O'Melveny involved claims by receivers
brought pursuant to state receivership statutes. The claims were not
subject to § 541's qualitative component.24
Though bankruptcy trustee claims are subject to § 541's qualitative
component, as discussed earlier, the qualitative component does not
apply to the application of in pari delicto. Section 541 may make a
trustee subject to in pari delicto, but determining that the trustee is
subject to in pari delicto does not end the analysis. Public policy may
dictate that relief must be granted even when a party is said to be in
pari delicto. When engaging in this second half of the in pari delicto
analysis, § 541 does not limit courts to consideration of pre-petition
facts. Courts are free, and in some states, compelled by the applicable
state law, to consider the post-petition reality when determining how
dismissal would affect public policy. Recognizing that § 541's qualitative component does not apply to the applicationof the in pari delicto
defense, courts are free to weigh the very same considerations that
determined the Scholes and O'Melveny rulings.
C.

Alternative Interpretations

The inequitable results of precedents dismissing trustee claims have
been subject to much criticism. Alternative interpretations of § 541's
interaction with in pari delicto have accompanied the criticism.
Professor Davis contends that, when interpreting § 541, courts
should ignore state law and create a new property conception based
on federal law." Under his federal property-law concept, in pari
delicto would have no place when an innocent trustee is asserting
claims on behalf of innocent creditors.2 43 However, Professor Davis's
contention would require a reversal of longstanding precedent that
property interests are defined by applicable state law. The Supreme
Court has unequivocally held that federal courts cannot create federal
equitable doctrines to supplant state-law property rights. 2 "
239. See, e.g.,Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1281,
1284-85 (10th Cir. 1996).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Davis, supra note 11, at 519-20.
243. Id.
244. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (absent specific provisions to
the contrary, "Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the
assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law."), superseded by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)
(1994).
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Professor Alam has argued that § 541 only defines "property of the
estate" rather than defenses to claims against "property of the estate." 24 5 Under this view, § 541 simply defines the trustee's standing
to assert a claim rather than the merits of the claim. 2 46 A New York
bankruptcy court recently adopted this view in In re Adelphia Communications.24 7 Judge Gerber held that "[w]hile section 541 is relevant to an analysis of the ownership of the cause of action, and
standing to assert it," § 541 is irrelevant to determining what state law
defenses exist against the estate.2 48 Accordingly, § 541 limits the
standing analysis to pre-petition facts but it imposes no such limit
when considering defenses.
This view is difficult to reconcile with the longstanding and unwavering precedent holding that a trustee "stands in the shoes of the
debtor" when asserting a claim that constitutes property of the estate.
Interpreting § 541 so that it has no bearing on determining the defenses a trustee is subject to would constitute a momentous reversal of
decades of rulings.
The view errors by circumscribing § 541 to defining procedural
standing rights rather than defining the particular scope of a party's
legal right. Standing speaks to a party's proceduralright to be heard
with respect to property, but does not define the party's particular
legal rights. Section 541 is the source of a party's standing in that it
defines what claims belong to the estate. But § 541 does excise the
debtor's interest from all other related interest. Interests do not exist
in a vacuum. A joint-tenants interest in a home is limited by the rights
of other joint-tenants. A claim for an unpaid account is limited by any
applicable state law defenses. Section 541 brings into the estate the
joint-tenant's interest subject to the other tenant's interest. Section
541 brings into the estate the debtor's claim for an unpaid account
subject to a statute of limitations or any other applicable defenses.
Section 541 does not bring into the estate absolute dominion over the
home by virtue of the debtor's rights as a joint-tenant anymore than it
brings into the estate a claim for an unpaid account stripped of any
applicable defenses.
The standing-focused view would also lead to inequitable results.
Under this view, in pari delicto would never apply to trustees. Under
this view, defining "property of the estate" and defenses to estate
claims are wholly independent. Because defining the claim and defining defenses to the claim are independent, § 541's qualitative compo245. Alam, supra note 10, at 307 ("In assessing the property rights of the bankruptcy estate, these courts have confused the possible existence of an equitable defense with the very existence of the bankruptcy estate's claim.").
246. Id. at 321-24.
247. Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Adelphia Commc'ns
Corp.), 365 B.R. 24, 51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
248. Id.
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nent has no bearing on defining the defense. Without § 541 requiring
courts to consider pre-petition facts, courts could evaluate the defenses only with respect to the actual parties. The actual plaintiff, the
trustee, did not participate in the wrongdoing. Without wrongdoing,
the first prong of the two-part in paridelicto analysis is not met. Without meeting the first prong, the second prong of balancing the equities
is never triggered.
There may in fact be situations where in pari delicto should be applied to trustees. The trustee will always be bringing claims on behalf
of the estate, but the trustee may not always be bringing claims on
behalf of innocent creditors. Not all estates are insolvent. Some estates may be able to pay all creditors in full and even pay returns on
equity holders. Insiders involved in a corporate fraud may have
claims against the estate or could be equity holders that could in fact
receive proceeds from trustee litigation where the estate is solvent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For most of the last two decades, circuit court precedent has placed
a substantial obstacle to trustee recoveries from third parties who
were complicit in a corporate fraud. Commentators and lower courts
have railed against the inequities of these results. Yet prior precedent
accurately interpreted the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and state law. Prior precedent was not wrong but incomplete.
Faced with different questions, courts within the Fifth Circuit have
been given the opportunity to complete the analysis. The Fifth Circuit
courts recognize that trustees are subject to the in pari delicto defense.
But the Fifth Circuit courts also recognize that finding that the trustee
is in pari delicto begins rather than ends the analysis. Courts must
rigorously consider the applicable state law's formulation of the doctrine. Many state law formulations, like Texas's, may require courts to
consider the public policy implications of dismissing trustee claims.
When considering the public policy implications, courts are free to
consider the fact that a trustee rather than the actual malfeasant party
is bringing the claim. Section 541 subjects trustees to in pari delicto,
but § 541 does not require courts to ignore the post-petition reality
when analyzing public policy implications. Section 541 defines rights
and defenses. Section 541 has no relevance to applying the defined
rights and defenses.
The Fifth Circuit courts' completion of the in pari delicto analysis
could not have been more timely. The financial meltdown has uncovered a bevy of fraudulent investment schemes that will keep bankruptcy courts busy for years to come. The Fifth Circuit courts' in pari
delicto analysis will give trustees the opportunity to increase estate
assets and allow for more equitable distributions to innocent creditors.
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